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The empirical literature suggests that repatriation decisions of U.S. multinational 
corporations are influenced by taxes. Although the U.S. and Japan adopt the same 
foreign tax credit system, we have found no evidence that corporate taxes have 
significantly affected dividend repatriation of Japanese multinationals. Instead, we 
have found that almost half of Japanese foreign affiliates pay dividends and their 
average marginal dividend payout rate is about twenty percent. The results also 
suggest that the repatriation behavior varies across industries and countries. 
Furthermore, parent companies’ financial status is found to influence the profit 
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1．Introduction 
  The effect of corporate taxes on multinational corporations has been an animated 
debate in recent years. Many countries, including the United States and Japan, tax 
foreign incomes of their residents. The U.S. system of taxing foreign incomes has 
attracted a great deal of attention
1. The U.S. taxes foreign incomes of American 
companies, grants credits for foreign taxes paid to avoid double taxation, and permits 
tax deferral for the unrepatriated income. Thus, while the income of foreign 
subsidiaries is not taxed until repatriated as dividends, it will be levied an additional 
tax when remitted if the corporate tax rate of the U.S. is higher than the rate of a 
foreign country. Empirical findings suggest that repatriation taxes have a significant 
negative effect on repatriation of American multinationals. Using the IRS tax return 
data from 1984, Hines and Hubbard (1990) analyze the behavior of U.S. 
multinationals. They find that eighty-four percent of them did not pay dividends to 
their parent companies in 1984, and conclude that one percent decrease in the 
repatriation tax is associated with a 4 percent increase in dividend payout rates.
2 Desai, 
Foley, and Hines (2001) indicate that one percent lower repatriation tax rate is 
associated with one percent higher dividends. In a similar way to the U.S. tax system, 
Japanese tax system imposes repatriation taxes that vary inversely with foreign tax 
rates. Since Japanese corporate tax rate is higher than the U. S. rate (U.S. Department 
of the Treasury, Office of Tax Policy, 2007), the same problem might happen to 
Japanese multinationals; they may not repatriate their foreign incomes by shifting 
their profits to lower tax countries. 
The Subpart F and the check-the-box regulations for hybrid entities are the rules by 
which U.S. multinationals abide when they are engaged in business activities across 
national borders. Joint Committee on Taxation (2005) refers to the techniques for 
using hybrid entities under the check-the-box rules in order to avoid the creation of 
Subpart F income.
3 Sullivan (2006) argues that since 1998 the check-the-box rules 
have allowed U.S. corporations to engage in earnings stripping transactions. He shows 
that thirty percent of the before-tax profits of foreign affiliates were located in 
countries where average effective tax rates were twenty percentage points below the 
U.S. rate. 
These behavioral responses to corporate taxes of multinational corporations have 
resulted in deadweight loss of taxation. Desai and Hines (2004) estimate a U.S. tax 
burden on foreign income in the neighborhood of $50 billion a year. Consequently, 
they suggest that a movement from a credit to exemption system has a compelling 
logic. In the United States, economists recently discuss whether the U.S. government 
should adopt the exemption system for foreign income rather than the credit system. 
Graetz and Oosterhuis (2001) suggest that under the exemption regime simplification 
could be achieved and the costs of complying with U.S. international tax rules might 
decrease substantially for U.S. corporations. Altshuler and Grubert (2001) provide no 
consistent or definitive evidence that location decisions would be significantly 
changed if dividends were to be exempted from U.S. corporate tax. Mullins (2006) 
finds that there is no clear view on whether the move to the territorial basis would 
benefit the United States. 
                                                 
1 For example, Desai and Hines (2003), Hines (2006), and Hubbard (2006) discuss international tax 
policy in the United States. 
2 Note that in their regressions, dividend payout rates are calculated as dividends over assets. 
3 See also Altshuler and Grubert (2006).   2
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of tax system on repatriation 
behavior of Japanese multinationals and to compare our results with the U.S. 
counterparts. In spite of the fact that the tax systems of the two countries have rested 
on the residential principle, and that their tax rates are among the highest in the world, 
our empirical finding is that, unlike U.S. multinationals, Japanese companies have not 
employed as much aggressive tax planning as U.S. companies. 
This study uses the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled by Japanese 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (hereinafter referred to as METI) and finds 
that almost half of the foreign affiliates of Japanese multinationals pay their dividends 
to Japan, and that their marginal dividend payout rate is about twenty percent on 
average. However, no significant effect of the repatriation taxes on the dividend 
repatriation has been detected. Our discoveries are rather that the repatriation decision 
depends on such firm-specific characteristics as the age and ownership of foreign 
subsidiaries; the older Japanese foreign affiliates and the higher the shareholding rates 
of their parent companies, the higher the rates of repatriation of profits to the home 
country. These are the findings of the first empirical research that analyzes the effect 
of taxes on dividend repatriation of Japanese multinational corporations. 
The results also suggest that the repatriation behavior varies across industries and 
countries; the elasticity of dividends with respect to net income is higher in the 
electrical machinery than in the transportation equipment industry. As for regional 
differences, subsidiaries in Europe and North America send more dividends from their 
net income than in Asia. Another interesting result is that the repatriation of profits 
responds more strongly to the ownership than either to net income or the age of 
subsidiaries in Asia. Furthermore, the financial status of parent companies matters and 
more profits tend to be sent back to them when they are in loss, implying that 
dividends from foreign subsidiaries has played an important role for adjusting the 
income for the parent companies. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data 
sets used for the analysis, and presents heuristic findings of repatriation behavior of 
the foreign affiliates of Japanese multinational firms. The third section deals with the 
regression model for analyzing dividend repatriation, and the fourth section presents 
the results. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2．Japanese DIA: Sources of Data and Evidence 
2-1. Data Sources 
In this section, we start with an overview of Japanese direct investment abroad 
(DIA, hereinafter). We resort to the Balance of Payments Statistics published by the 
Bank of Japan and Japanese Ministry of Finance as the source of historical data on 
foreign direct investments. Figure 1 displays the outward and inward direct 
investment by calendar year. There is a sharp rise in outward direct investment during 
the late 1980s when Japanese economy was in the midst of asset inflation. However, 
when the bubbles burst in the early 1990s, outward direct investment decreased 
sharply. The figure shows that Japanese outward investment is starting to increase 
recent years. By contrast, inward direct investment remains at low levels, showing 
Japan is continuously a capital-exporting country.   3
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
We need to use firm-level data when analyzing dividend repatriation behavior of 
multinational corporations and the data we used is the Survey of Overseas Business 
Activities compiled by METI. It covers the period from 1989 to 2003. The survey 
consists of two parts. One is the basic survey, which is more detailed of the two, and 
carried out every three years over the period, starting 1989. The other is the trend 
survey which is comparatively simple and carried out in every year between the basic 
surveys. Finance, insurance and real estate companies are excluded in this survey, 
because its main focus is on manufacturing industries. It enables us to investigate the 
relationship between foreign affiliates and their parent companies. Here, a foreign 
affiliate of a Japanese firm is defined as follows: (1) a foreign firm in which a 
Japanese firm holds ten percent or more of the equity, or (2) a firm in which more 
than fifty percent of the equity is held by a foreign affiliate that is itself more than 
fifty percent Japanese-owned. 
  The coverage of the data is extensive. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix show the 
scope of the data. In Table A1, we compare the Survey of Overseas Business Activities 
and the Hojin Kigyo Tokei [Incorporated Enterprise Statistics]. The Hojin Kigyo Tokei 
is the most basic financial statistics of Japanese corporations. Table A1 indicates that 
our data account for about twenty to thirty percent of all Japanese corporations. 
 
[Table A1 in the Appendix A about here] 
 
  In Table A2, we compare the two statistics with the company samples confined to 
large businesses, that is, those with paid-in capital greater than or equal to one billion 
yen, excluding finance, insurance, and real estate companies. The table shows that the 
Survey of Overseas Business Activities now covers almost half of large companies of 
the Hojin Kigyo Tokei. 
 
[Table A2 in the Appendix A about here] 
 
  Table B in the Appendix displays the distribution of companies by industry in 1989 
and 2001. The table indicates that the manufacturing industries have the largest 
number of companies (about fifty and sixty percent, respectively, of all foreign 
affiliates and their parents), and the wholesale and retail trade has the next largest, 
about twenty to thirty percent of all foreign affiliates and their parents. The companies 
belonging to electricity, gas, heat supply, water, transportation, information and 
communications were originally classified into one industry, but reclassified and 
divided into three in 1993. Except for this reclassification and the increasing number 
of transportation, information and communication firms, there is no drastic change in 
the distribution of the companies by industry. 
 
[Table B in the Appendix B about here]   4
 
2-2. Major Characteristics of Japanese DIA 
  2-2-1. Time-Series Evidence 
  We next turn to the major characteristics of Japanese DIA from the view point of 
corporate taxes. Observations in this section are made from three perspectives: time 
series, regional and industrial. 
We start with our observation from a time-series perspective. Table 1 displays the 
financial status of Japanese foreign affiliates. The table shows that the number of 
foreign affiliates, total assets, sales, before-tax profit, taxes, and employees increased 
over time. In particular, before-tax profit as percentage of sales was 1 percent in 1989, 
and tripled to 3.2 percent in 2003. After-tax profit as percentage of sales also 
increased. This means that Japanese multinationals are raising higher profits on 
foreign turf. By contrast, effective tax rates were slightly decreased. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  Table 2 deals with the financial status of parent companies. In contrast to their 
foreign affiliates, the table shows that their profits, in either before- or after-tax terms, 
were reduced; the before-tax rate of profit of 9.53 percent in the year 1989 was 
reduced to 7.28 percent in 2001, and the after-tax rate from 4.58 percent to -1.75 
percent over the same period. Sales were stable over time, and the amounts of both 
dividends and royalties received increased significantly. Of the two modes of foreign 
affiliates’ financial contributions to their parents, royalties played a more important 
role than dividends. On the other hand, the amount of remitted interest was decreasing. 
It would be worthwhile to note that about 18.8 percent of before-tax profit of the 




[Table 2 about here] 
 
  Putting it all together, foreign affiliates of Japanese multinationals were earning 
higher profits than their parent companies, and their royalty payments and dividend 
repatriation became very important sources of revenue for the parents. Moreover, this 
trend seems to be strengthened as the DIA of Japanese companies continues to expand. 
Next, we investigate our data from regional and industrial perspectives. 
 
2-2-2. Regional and Industrial Evidence 
  Here, we would like to sketch the regional and industrial characteristics of Japanese 
DIA, using the results of the latest basic survey of the year 2001. Table 3 displays the 
financial status of Japanese foreign affiliates by country. As for the before-tax profits, 
Japanese multinationals earned the largest profits from the United States in 2001; 
China, Thailand, Australia, and Taiwan were the second to fifth countries in the order 
                                                 
4 (¥0.53 trillion + ¥0.84 trillion) / ¥7.28 trillion × 100 = 18.8 %.   5
of the amounts of the profits. The top three countries, the U.S., China and Thailand, 
had also yielded the largest after-tax profits. Much of assets of Japanese 
multinationals were placed in the U.S., Singapore, Netherlands, and the U.K. due to 
their attractive financial markets. However, as for tangible assets, namely, plant and 
equipment, the three most important countries are the U.S., China, and Thailand, 
reflecting the fact that these assets are major sources of profits for Japanese foreign 
affiliates. Japanese multinationals enjoyed large sales in the U.S., the U.K., Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Netherlands, Germany, China, and Thailand in 2001, and they 
employed a number of people in the three biggest countries plus Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippine; these south east Asian countries have advantages in low-wage work force. 
  Affiliates of Japanese multinationals in the U.S. paid a large amount of corporate 
tax. We calculate the effective corporate-income tax rate by first identifying only 
those affiliates reporting positive before-tax profit and then taking the average ratio of 
foreign income taxes paid to the before-tax profit. The results show that the effective 
tax rates in China, Hong Kong, and Saudi Arabia are around 10 percent. It is striking 
that the effective tax rates in Ireland, Vietnam, Panama, the UAE (United Arab 
Emirates) are enormously low.
5 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
  We would now like to look at the characteristics of Japanese DIA by industry. 
Table 4 presents the financial status of Japanese foreign affiliates by industry. In the 
year 2001, the industries which yielded large profits were wholesale and retail trade, 
transportation equipment, and chemicals. Therefore, those industries paid a large 
amount of tax. Two industries which achieved huge sales are the transportation 
equipment and the electrical machinery industries. It is interesting that the after-tax 
profit of the former is positive, whereas that of the latter is negative. Both of these two 
industries hire a large number of employees at their foreign affiliates. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
2-3. Dividend Repatriation of Japanese Multinationals 
  This section examines the dividend repatriation of Japanese multinationals over the 
period 1989－2001. Since only limited information is reported in the trend surveys, 
our results here are restricted to the years when the basic surveys are available. Table 
5 shows the ratio of the number of foreign affiliates with positive dividends to the 
total number of affiliates. We find that the ratio is increasing and 44 percent of the 
foreign affiliates of Japanese multinationals paid dividends to Japan in 2001. 
Compared with the results of American multinationals examined by Hines and 
Hubbard (1990), this ratio is quite high. Using the IRS tax return in 1984, they 
analyzed the repatriation behavior of U.S. multinationals and found that only 16 
percent of them paid dividends to their parent companies. By contrast, we find that 44 
percent of Japanese multinationals paid dividends to Japan. 
                                                 
5 See the Sullivan (2004) for the analysis of U.S. multinationals in the same year 2001.   6
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 6 shows the dividend payout ratios by industry. Dividend payout ratios are 
calculated by first identifying those affiliates which report positive net income and 
then by dividing the total dividends paid to Japan by their total net income. As 
illustrated in Table 6, the average ratio for all industries is 27 percent in 2001. Within 
manufacturing industries, there are significant differences by industry. For example, 
the ratio is higher in the electrical machinery industry and lower in the transportation 
equipment industry. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
  Table 7 shows dividends paid by foreign affiliates to Japan by industry. We find 
that electrical machinery industry and wholesale and retail trade industry received a 
large number of dividends every year. We also find that the manufacturing industries 
account for about half of the dividends received by Japanese multinational 
corporations each year. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 8 and Table 9 report foreign affiliates’ dividends by country of their 
incorporation. Table 8 shows foreign affiliates’ dividend payout ratios. Corresponding 
yen volumes of dividends paid to Japan are reported in Table 9. Table 8 shows that 
dividend payout ratio varies across countries. Dividend payout ratios are notably high 
in Panama where multinationals own a flag of convenience ships. The results also 
suggest that dividend payout ratios are relatively high in European countries. By 
contrast, dividend payout ratios in Southeast Asia such as in Thailand and Indonesia 
stay low. Yet there is an exception. The table shows that dividend payout ratios in 
Singapore are relatively high in recent years. This partly reflects the fact that 
Singapore has become the first regional headquarter in the Asia-Pacific area. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
  As illustrated in Table 9, foreign affiliates in the United States paid the largest 
dividends to Japan every year. Those in Singapore paid the second largest amount of 
dividends to Japan in 1995 and 1998. This fact is an intriguing discovery because the 
economic size of Singapore is not so big. Japanese multinational corporations may use 
Singapore when they remit dividends to their home country in order to use some tax 
planning techniques. From around the turn of the century, dividends from China are 
sharply increasing. 
 
[Table 9 about here]   7
 
2-4. Repatriation Patterns of Japanese Multinationals 
Dividend remittance is not a sole method to repatriate profits to parent companies. 
As shown in Table 10, interest, royalties, and other payments are important as well. 
The table indicates these payments are increasing over a period of years. But other 
payments such as technical fees are distinctly decreasing. In 1989, other payments 
accounted for seventy-two percent of total remittance to Japan. More importantly, as 
shown in the table, royalties have increased as a percentage of total payments. 
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
Table 11 exhibits distribution patterns by industry. Over all, Japanese 
multinationals repatriate more royalties than dividends in recent years. This pattern is 
evident in the transportation equipment industry. This is consistent with the analysis 
by Yamaguchi (2004). In contrast, other payments such as technical fees are more 
important than dividends and royalties in the electrical machinery industry. 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
3．The Regression Model 
  Before we present our regression model for testing the impact of taxes on dividends, 
a brief survey of literature should be in order. Mutti (1981) finds that repatriation 
decisions of U.S.-owned foreign manufacturing subsidiaries are influenced by tax 
incentives. Hines and Hubbard (1990) analyze a cross-section data of U.S. 
multinationals and find one percent decrease in the repatriation tax is associated with 
a four percent increase in dividend payout rates. They show that tax considerations are 
very important determinants of the timing of dividend repatriations. Altshuler and 
Grubert (2003) deal with the case where foreign affiliates invest in passive assets, 
which the parent can borrow against, or in related affiliates which can be used as 
vehicles for tax-favored repatriations. They have found that controlled foreign 
corporations that face high repatriation taxes make greater investments in related 
affiliates and send a greater share of their dividends to other foreign affiliates. Desai, 
Foley, and Hines (2001) also endorse the view that repatriation decisions of U.S. 
multinationals are influenced by taxes. They indicate that one percent lower 
repatriation tax rate is associated with one percent higher dividends. The implication 
is that multinational parent firms require steady dividend payments from the income 
of their foreign affiliates. They show this fact by using a panel-data set with parent 
fixed effects. Since our data set is cross-sectional, we add a parent dummy to control 
the characteristics of parent companies. 
  Recently, Power and Silverstein (2007) use a balanced panel of U.S. income tax 
returns from 1998 to 2002 and find that forty percent of U.S. corporations with 
foreign source income are not taxable because they are in loss. They show that about 
sixty percent of total dividends are repatriated by U.S. parents that are never in loss. 
The less the parent is in loss, the more it tends to repatriate foreign incomes. The 
results indicate that companies face unique incentives when they are in loss. A small   8
subset of firms appears to take advantage of the opportunity of being loss to repatriate 
substantial amount of dividends without residual U.S. tax. However, the majority of 
these firms appear to maximize their net operating loss deductions (NOLDs) by both 
avoiding repatriations and repatriating smaller amounts of foreign source dividends 
when they are in loss. In conclusion, parents in loss could repatriate income in forms 
that minimize accumulation of excess credits and maximize aversion of immediate 
U.S. tax. We would like to take this aspect into consideration and analyze the 
relationship between foreign affiliate’s dividends payment and parent company’s loss 
status. 
  The literature suggests that tax affects repatriation behavior significantly and it is 
necessary for us to add enough control variables such as age of the company and its 
ownership to identify the effects of taxes
6. We estimate the following equation by 
both OLS and Tobit regression methods where i stands for ith foreign affiliate and 
i ε  is the error term. We exclude foreign affiliates whose net incomes are negative 
because it is impossible to pay dividends when net income is negative. 
 
i i i i i i Ownership Age Openness Income Net Tax Dividend 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β α + + + + + =  
i i i Loss in Parent or Dummy Parent ε β + + ) ( 6  
 
  While the decisions relating to where and how much to invest may be influenced 
much by host countries’ average and marginal effective tax rates, the decision about 
where to place the profits of foreign affiliates would be determined primarily by the 
differential between home and host countries’ statutory tax rates. This observation is 
also made by Auerbach, Devereux, and Simpson (2007), and the statutory tax rates 
are taken from KPMG (2002) for our study. 
The business profits of foreign affiliates are generally not subject to Japanese 
taxation until they are remitted to Japanese parent companies. When repatriations 
occur, they receive a credit for foreign taxes paid up to the Japanese tax rate. In theory, 
higher taxed foreign affiliates have higher payout rates than less taxed subsidiaries, 
reflecting the lower net repatriation taxes associated with receiving dividends. 
Therefore, affiliates in the country whose tax rates are high will pay larger dividends 
to Japanese parent companies, since doing so generates accompanying foreign tax 
credits that offset the associated Japanese tax liability. This is because Japanese 
corporate tax rate is relatively high compared to other countries. Thus, predicted 
coefficient on Tax rates is positive if Japanese multinationals pay attention to tax rates. 
We ignore foreign withholding taxes on dividends since these tax rates are usually 
zero, ten, or twenty percent, and do not have enough variation to change the results. 
The coefficient on Net Income presents the marginal dividend payout ratio. Needless 
to say, this coefficient is assumed to be positive. 
A problem of preceding research is that tax rates absorb all effects stemming from 
the characteristics of a country if other variable representing them are not put into the 
regression models. We avoid this specification error by adding a control variable, 
                                                 
6 Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007) find that ownership structure affects dividend repatriation behavior.   9
Openness. This is a variable taken from Penn World Table 6.2.
7, and represents a 
degree to which a country is open to international trade. If a host government adopts 
an open trade policy, Japanese multinationals would find it easier to set up their 
operations in that country. Thus, the expected coefficient on Openness is positive. 
  We explain other control variables which represent firm-specific characteristics. 
Following Julio and Ikenberry (2004), we adopt the hypothesis that mature companies, 
particularly those with limited growth prospects, may use dividends to reassure 
investors about the quality of earnings. The variable Age stands for the years after 
establishment of foreign affiliates, and the coefficient on it is considered to be positive. 
Since the foreign affiliate whose ownership share of Japanese shareholders is 
relatively high needs to repatriate more dividends to Japan, the coefficient on 
Ownership is predicted to be positive. A dummy variable, Parent in Loss, takes the 
value of 1 when its net income prior to any foreign source dividend repatriations is 
negative, and zero otherwise. If foreign affiliates of loss-making parent firms 
repatriate more dividends to Japan, the coefficient on the dummy variable is positive. 
Descriptive statistics for variables are summarized in Table C in the Appendix. 
 
[Table C in the Appendix C about here] 
 
4．Results 
  Our results of OLS and Tobit estimations in 1998 and 2001 are shown in Table 12. 
Columns 1 and 2 report the results of simple OLS regressions without parent dummies. 
Columns 3 and 4 report the results of OLS regressions that add parent dummies. 
Columns 5 and 6 report coefficients estimated with a Tobit procedure since dividend 
payments cannot be negative. The table also reports the elasticities of dividends. 
In none of the above regressions, we have found any significant effect of corporate 
taxes on dividend repatriation behavior of Japanese multinational corporations. 
Although we expect the coefficients on tax rate to be positive, estimated coefficients 
on tax rate are either statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level or even negative. 
Unlike U.S. counterparts, Japanese foreign affiliates do not respond to tax rates. 
We can see the estimated marginal dividend payout rate from the table. The 
variable Net Income is statistically significant at the one percent level in both OLS 
and Tobit regressions, and the marginal payout rate is about 0.20 in 2001, that is, 
twenty percent of net income of foreign affiliates is remitted to Japan. And the 
coefficients estimated by using OLS and Tobit are quite close.  
Next, we examine the relationship between firm-specific characteristics and 
affiliates’ dividend repatriation behavior. The variable Age is statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level in both OLS and Tobit regressions, meaning that older affiliates 
tend to repatriate more dividends than younger affiliates. The variable Ownership is 
statistically significant at the one percent level in OLS regressions.  Hence, as the 
stake of Japanese shareholders increases, more dividends are sent to Japan. The result 
is not affected by the addition of parent dummy, which represents a control variable 
for the parents’ propensity to pay or/and receive dividends. This is consistent with the 
                                                 
7 Summers and Heston (1991) explain Penn World Table.   10
statement by Altshuler and Newlon (1993) that the presence of parent characteristics 
does not affect the estimated coefficients on other variables substantially. 
  Table 12 also shows the results of the year 1998, which are similar to those of 
2001; the dividend payout rate is 0.19, and other qualitative results of regressions are 
mostly the same. If we pool 2001 and 1998 data and regress with country fixed effects 
in place of Openness to control specific characteristics, we obtain the same results that 
country tax rates have no significant effect on dividend repatriations. 
 
[Table 12 about here] 
 
We next look at the determinants of repatriation behavior of foreign affiliates by 
region and by industry. Table 13 presents the results of estimation in 2001, and as in 
the preceding discoveries, tax rates of host countries here have no significant effects 
on dividend repatriations in any region. The table shows that the coefficient on Net 
Income is largest in Europe, second in North America, and lowest in Asia. The 
elasticities of dividends with respect to Net Income are also arrayed in the same order 
among the three continents. 
The coefficients on other variables, Age and Ownership, are statistically significant 
at the one percent level in Asia. Interestingly, the results in Table 13 show that the 
elasticity of dividends with respect to Ownership  is higher than the elasticity of 
dividends with respect to Net Income or Age in Asia. This evidence implies that, in 
Asia, the amount of dividend repatriation of Japanese foreign affiliates is primarily 
affected by shareholding ratio rather than their earnings. This is probably due to the 
fact that Japanese companies are engaged in more joint ventures in Asia than in North 
America and Europe. We find from our data set that the mean ownership ratio held by 
Japanese shareholders is around 65 percent in Asia, whereas the ratio is 82 percent in 
Europe and 85 percent in North America. There is a large variation in Ownership 
variables in Asian affiliates, which contributes to increasing the explanatory power of 
Ownership in Asian region. 
Table 13 reports the results by industry in 2001. We find that the elasticity of 
dividends with respect to Net Income is higher in the electrical machinery industry 
than in the transportation equipment industry. We also find that the elasticity of 
dividends with respect to Ownership is higher than Net Income in the manufacturing 
industries. 
 
[Table 13 about here] 
 
  Our last examination is concerned with the relationship between the parents’ loss 
status and their affiliates’ dividend repatriation behavior. Here we define that a 
company is in loss when its net income is negative prior to any foreign source 
dividend (Power and Silverstein, 2007). A dummy variable, Parent in Loss, takes the 
value of 1 when the parent company is in loss, and zero otherwise. If foreign affiliates 
of loss-making parent firms repatriate more dividends to Japan, the coefficient on the 
dummy variable is positive.   11
Table 14 indicates that the dummy variable, Parent in Loss, is statistically significant 
at the one percent level in 2001. However, it is not in 1998. This indicates that foreign 
affiliates of loss-making parent firms were more pressed by their parent companies to 
sent dividends in 2001. We consider that this has much to do with the difference of 
parent companies’ financial situations between 1998 and 2001; the aggregate net 
profit of parent companies in 1998 was positive in our data set, whereas it was 
negative in 2001. In 2001, the Japanese economy was at the nadir of recession, and 
the chance of Japanese companies plunging into the red was very high. In this 
situation, Japanese multinationals seem to have their profit-making foreign affiliates 
sent back dividends to parent companies in Japan to avoid a liquidity shortage. This is 
our interpretation of the effect of parent companies’ financial situation on dividend 
repatriation, and a similar observation has recently presented by Foley, Hartzell, 
Titman, and Twite (2007). 
 
 [Table 14 about here] 
 
5．Conclusion 
When taxing foreign source income, both the U.S. and Japan employ a world-wide 
tax principle; credits are granted to the taxes paid in foreign countries up to the 
amount that would have been taxed when the income is fully taxable in home 
countries. This paper has analyzed the effect of taxes on repatriation behavior of 
Japanese multinationals and compared the results between Japanese and the U.S. 
companies. This is the first empirical research that analyzes the effect of taxes on 
dividend repatriation of Japanese multinational corporations. 
We have used a cross-section data of Japanese multinational corporations to 
investigate the repatriation of their foreign incomes. We find that almost half of them 
paid dividends to Japan and that the marginal dividend payout rate for all industries is 
about twenty percent on average. 
However, no significant evidence has been found supporting the effect of corporate 
taxes on dividend repatriation behavior of Japanese foreign affiliates. Our empirical 
findings suggest that their repatriation decisions depend on such firm-specific 
characteristics as the age (the number of years after establishment) or the ownership 
(the shareholding rate of parent companies), and not on country-specific 
characteristics such as tax rates.  
The results also suggest that dividend repatriation varies across industries and 
countries. In particular, the elasticity of dividends with respect to net income is higher 
in the electrical machinery industry than other industries including the transportation 
equipment industry. The results also suggest that the elasticity of dividends with 
respect to net income is higher in Europe and North America than in Asia. 
Interestingly, the results show that the elasticity of dividends with respect to 
ownership is higher than that to net income or age in Asia. This evidence suggests that 
in Asia the amount of dividend repatriation of Japanese multinationals is primarily 
affected by shareholding ratio rather than earnings. 
Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between the parent companies’ loss 
status and their foreign affiliates’ dividend repatriation behavior. When the Japanese 
economy was recovering from a recession in 2001, foreign affiliates whose parent   12
company incurred a loss repatriated more dividends to Japan. We have suggested that 
a need for cash may explain this behavior. 
These are the summary of our study. So far, we have found no empirical evidence 
that corporate taxes affect dividend repatriation of Japanese multinationals. The 
results suggest that they are not engaged in as much aggressive tax planning as their 
U.S. counterparts. However, things might change. If the financial situation of parent 
companies in Japan is much improved, it could turn out that wide differentials 
between host countries’ and Japanese corporate tax rates would let their foreign 
affiliates retain more of their profits abroad as the theory of international tax predicts. 
Although not touched in the paper, dividend remittance is not a sole means for 
sending profits from foreign affiliates to parent companies. Royalty and interest 
payments are other ways for this, and the amount of royalty payments has already 
surpassed the dividend payments. Clearly, more room is open for further study to 
understand the link between corporate behavior and tax policies.   13
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1989    6362  55.3  12.5  1132   93.2  0.90  0.45  0.42  1.0  0.5  30.5 
1990    7986  -  -  1549   99.8  0.95  0.35  -  1.0  0.4  - 
1991    8520  -  -  1621   88.7  0.28  -0.10  -  0.3  -0.1  - 
1992    7108  53.9  12.4  1228   79.0  0.32  0.03  0.24  0.4   0.4  23.9 
1993  10005 -  -  1946   91.7 0.29  -0.18  -  0.3  -0.2  - 
1994  11502 -  -  2185   93.1 1.10  0.62  -  1.2  0.7  - 
1995  10416  57.8  12.6  2218   95.0  1.48  0.87  0.45  1.6   0.9  25.6 
1996  12657 -  -  2744 124  2.09  1.38  -  1.7  1.1  - 
1997  13166 -  -  2834 128  2.01  0.78  -  1.6  0.6  - 
1998  13017 89.7  20.5  2630  127  1.78  0.95  0.64  1.4    0.7  24.9 
1999  13939 -  -  3160 119  2.34  1.44  -  2.0  1.2  - 
2000  14991 -  -  3452 129  3.14  1.97  -  2.4  1.5  - 
2001  13693 88.7  16.3  3180  135  2.27  0.83  0.73  1.7    0.6  25.9 
2002  15509 -  -  3456 139  3.72  1.63  -  2.7  1.2  - 
2003  15674 -  -  3782 146  4.67  3.18  -  3.2  2.2  - 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Notes: *Ordinary income ratio to net sales (%) = Ordinary income / Net sales ×100. 
  ** Net income or loss ratio to net sales (%) = Net income or loss / Net sales ×100. 
   *** Effective tax rates are calculated by first identifying those affiliates report positive before-tax profit and then taking the average ratio of foreign 




Table 2     Financial Status of Japanese Parent Companies    (Yen amounts in trillions) 































































1989  1361  250 44.0  2908  316 0.15 0.32 0.16 0.20  9.53  4.58 3.0  1.4 
1990  1616  - -  -  365 - - - -  11.0  5.48  3.0  1.5 
1991  1663  - -  -  363 - - - -  9.32  4.89  2.6  1.3 
1992  1459  274 61.3  3222  327 0.24 0.15 0.30 0.10  6.15  2.62 1.9  0.8 
1993  2139  - -  -  365 - - - -  -  -  -  - 
1994  2431  - -  -  354 - - - -  -  -  -  - 
1995  1840  301 67.6  3420  322 0.27 0.13 0.37 0.44  7.72  3.44 2.4  1.1 
1996  2097  - -  4273  340 - - - -  -  -  -  - 
1997  2230  - -  4401  340 - - - -  -  -  -  - 
1998  2084  347 95.9  3781  321 0.43 0.08 0.72 0.11  7.52  0.79 2.3  0.2 
1999  2153  - -  3803  324 - - - -  -  -  -  - 
2000  2041  - -  3839  300 - - - -  -  -  -  - 
2001  2093  291  80.4  3606  286 0.53 - 0.84 -  7.28  -1.75  2.5 -0.6 
2002  2423  - -  3662  314 - - - -  -  -  -  - 
2003  2638  - -  3841  329 - - - -  -  -  -  - 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Notes: *Ordinary income ratio to net sales (%) = Ordinary income / Net sales ×100. 
  ** Net income or loss ratio to net sales (%) = Net income or loss / Net sales ×100.   18
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Notes: *Ordinary income ratio to net sales (%) = Ordinary income / Net sales ×100. **Return on asset (%) = Net income / Total assets ×100. *** Effective tax rates are calculated by first 
identifying those affiliates report positive before-tax profit and then taking the weighted average ratio of foreign income taxes paid to the before-tax profit weighted by before-tax profit. 










































US  34567197  5443132 649824 55590221 780776 224790 343319 1.4 0.6 30.4 
China  3494376  1262721 536301 4231256 186175 162710 16997 4.4 4.6 10.9 
Thai  2589892  884609 308593 4078426 158115 125619 25680 3.8 4.8 18.6 
Australia  2196103  496473 41870 3631364 134838 98896 26681 3.7 4.5 28.0 
Taiwan  1993918  478944 110577 3537691 113337 82745 23536 3.2 4.1 22.5 
Hong Kong  2446769  155115 127731 7547375 97363 91376 10484 1.2 3.7 10.5 
Korea  1492635  460195 57120 1858755 94275 66181 24891 5.0 4.4 26.5 
Malaysia  1855300  709874 226725 3067356 93394 59545 19245 3.0 3.2 18.2 
Singapore  7499528  468517 60421 6935838 90265 42122 20467 1.3 0.5 18.5 
Indonesia  1750537  664512 264083 2077494 79687 51295 28210 3.8 2.9 28.9 
Mexico  838308  338160 54716 1260605 75063 43571 12994 5.9 5.1 42.2 
Canada  1854339  565699 33421 3882109 69143 45106 24796 1.7 2.4 38.2 
Philippine  1109475  398904 132583 1619314 56648 29138 12120 3.4 2.6 21.8 
Saudi Arabia  448865  291820 2295 161431 40147 34655 5214 24.8 7.7 12.9 
Netherlands  6094008  710427 69727 5356107 36188 2538 30769 0.6 0.04 26.6 
Spain  426455  136907 16801 898186 30583 23626 5013 3.4 5.5 27.2 
Chile  384338  30107 5069 381734 24600 17740 5489 6.4 4.6 22.1 
India  420485  173935 45269 630341 20459 12899 7636 3.2 3.0 28.7 
UK  5738678  541595 101713 8819511 19780 -335149 24210 0.2 -5.8 25.0 
Italy  386832  29195 11289 885632 19363 7861 9150 2.1 2.0 46.2 
Germany  1815566  236108 43893 4300550 16961 -1733 18153 0.3 -0.09 29.0 
Ireland  233530  118523 1343 79457 13498 10257 368 16.9 4.3 2.4 
Venezuela  131850  59165 2702 175540 12166 9328 1312 6.9 7.0 15.4 
Vietnam  247182  127700 40714 263770 11511 9203 586 4.3 3.7 5.4 
Panama  1827689  236606 976 3303589 8033 6565 13 0.2 0.3 0.2 
New Zealand  175875  74440 4917 249171 7089 7793 986 2.8 4.4 22.6 
Iran  31635  1969 2401 149524 6471 4847 1582 4.3 15.3 24.4 
Belgium  789737  66613 20364 2652895 5351 516 4123 0.2 0.06 36.5 
Colombia  157952  33325 6475 129173 4622 3828 656 3.5 2.4 17.8 
UAE  96950  26411 6056 263204 4561 4572 6 1.7 4.7 0.3 
All Countries  88672520  16345004 3180591 135203903 2266641 830216 732550 1.6 0.9 25.8   19
 










































Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fisheries  149757  65695 14491 129624 378 -3071 1138 0.2 -2.0 21.0 
Mining  2223275  638338 16377 795222 136228 105450 17741 17.1 4.7 20.8 
Construction  772641  122856 19918 658194 18933 9836 4861 2.8 1.2 16.6 
Manufacturing                 
  Food  1849774  575778 95038 2017508 125212 81690 32305 6.2 4.4 31.4 
  Textile  957156  402027 161641 917736 42997 24998 19632 4.6 2.6 31.7 
  Wood, Pulp, and Papers  817440  539594 31026 528625 9192 7025 2559 1.7 0.8 18.5 
  Chemicals  6036715  2122105 148173 5157078 298229 160274 119385 5.7 2.6 30.7 
 Petroleum and Coal   139044  62205 3686 208070 8788 6424 1343 4.2 4.6 22.8 
  Ceramics  997209  534863 47225 611740 36691 24247 7367 5.9 2.4 25.5 
  Steel  2393571  387328 47952 2373898 -85757 -120966 4419 -3.6 -5.0 18.3 
 Non-Ferrous Metals  1136642  552612 48344 876890 15657 614 14497 1.7 0.05 31.4 
 Fabricated Metal Products  377615  155643 31049 358227 12093 7262 3705 3.3 1.9 27.1 
  General Machinery  2580293  523563 128533 2968978 42077 -2087 29713 1.4 -0.08 22.9 
  Electrical Machinery  7464390  1795792 950641 20419364 1935 -190233 13425 0.00 -2.5 9.4 
  Transportation Equipment  14495429  3119248 682612 23612952 548761 362358 117623 2.3 2.4 26.8 
  Precision Instruments  671958  113135 70274 1295331 54302 36381 14411 4.1 5.4 25.6 
  Miscellaneous Manufacturing 1221308  405881 197011 2773142 44593 25616 17833 1.6 2.0 25.0 
Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply, 
and Water  292365  103643 442 32661 700 1912 359 2.1 0.6 9.7 
Transport  1156431  492874 48244 1627243 46751 33032 8522 2.8 2.8 22.1 
Information and 
Communications  1604079  46475 17093 292197 -24690 -330063 3396 -8.4 -20.5 30.8 
Wholesale and Retail Trade  27438951  1723917 334606 64905965 744120 461782 260550 1.1 1.6 30.1 
Finance and Insurance  10287403  660404 9730 1189718 38121 22334 12945 3.2 0.2 32.6 
Real Estate  656531  233089 7839 118345 8784 4010 2298 7.4 0.6 15.2 
Services  2891839  959083 66733 1209493 140287 100001 21955 11.5 3.4 17.4 
Others  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Total of Manufacturing 
Industries  41143115  11289774 2643205 64087223 1154770 423603 398217 1.8 1.0 24.6 
All Industries  88611816  16336148 3178678 135078201 2264382 828826 731982 1.6 0.9 25.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Notes: *Ordinary income ratio to net sales (%) = Ordinary income / Net sales ×100. **Return on asset (%) = Net income / Total assets ×100. *** Effective tax rates are calculated by first 
identifying those affiliates report positive before-tax profit and then taking the weighted average ratio of foreign income taxes paid to the before-tax profit weighted by before-tax profit.   20
 
Table 5     Ratio of Foreign Affiliates Who Paid Dividends to Japan 
Year 
Number of foreign affiliates 
with dividend information 
A 
Number of foreign affiliates with 





1989 3814  844  0.22 
1992 2396  943  0.39 
1995 5283  1621  0.31 
1998 4373  1923  0.44 
2001 4815  2119  0.44 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled 
by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Note: Ratio = (Number of foreign affiliates with positive dividends to Japan) ÷ (Number of 
foreign affiliates with dividend information).   21
 
Table 6     Foreign Affiliates’ Dividend Payout Ratio to Japan by Industry 
Japanese Industry  1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  .03   .07   .05   .10   .29  
Mining  .10   .54   .16   .45   .09  
Construction  .36   .15   .05   .17   .15  
Manufacturing       
  Food  .17   .17   .33   .28   .19  
  Textile  .17   .29   .47   .49   .28  
  Wood, Pulp, and Papers  .13   .75   .15   .10   .28  
  Chemicals  .15   .26   .19   .18   .23  
 Petroleum and Coal   .05   .13   .31   .08   .13  
  Ceramics  .19   .28   .19   .28   .35  
  Steel  .12   .26   .09   .14   .29  
 Non-Ferrous Metals  .15   .11   .14   .30   .49  
 Fabricated Metal Products  .05   .11   .24   .34   .23  
  General Machinery  .08   .21   .17   .22   .25  
  Electrical Machinery  .19   .33   .25   .47   .53  
  Transportation Equipment  .07   .12   .14   .15   .13  
  Precision Instruments  .03   .48   .41   .38   .38  
  Miscellaneous Manufacturing  .09   .19   .11   .24   .33  
Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply, and Water  .00   .00   .06  
Transport  .33   .39   .34  
Information and Communications 
.21   .41  
.00   .00   .04  
Wholesale and Retail Trade  .19   .07   .24   .39   .29  
Finance and Insurance  .11   .28   .15   .48   .14  
Real Estate  .13   .14   .11   .17   .25  
Services  .09   .21   .12   .27   .26  
Others  .05   .34   .06   .33   ---  
Total of Manufacturing Industries  .13   .27   .20   .25   .28  
All Industries  .15   .29   .20   .30   .27  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled 
by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Note: Dividend payout ratios are calculated by first identifying those affiliates report positive 
net income and then dividing the total dividends paid to Japan by such affiliates in each 
industry by their total net income. Dividend payout ratio = (Total dividends paid to Japan 
by foreign affiliates in industry X) ÷ (Total affiliate post-tax earnings in industry X).   22
 
Table 7     Dividends Paid by Foreign Affiliates to Japan by Industry 
Japanese Industry  1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  56 23 264 715 764
Mining  3828 11402 14392 22658  5387
Construction  2330 1758 465 1829 1750
Manufacturing    
  Food  1624 1853 9980 8710 7898
  Textile  1969 7619 11246 18221  4500
  Wood, Pulp, and Papers  4274 17912 3234 1164 6216
  Chemicals  10055 14007 23891 31385 31839
 Petroleum and Coal   44 192 363 288 438
  Ceramics  5059 5347 6888 13282  7410
  Steel  1841 2577 3156 4223 4115
 Non-Ferrous Metals  2295 1064 3816 6004  12399
 Fabricated Metal Products  323 283 833 1282 1688
  General Machinery  2851 3135 5310 16770  9766
  Electrical Machinery  15264 27318 39852 83445  113197
  Transportation Equipment  3450 8924 18027 36684 44158
  Precision Instruments  393 780 4885 2659  12465
  Miscellaneous Manufacturing  1174 3211 4323 5841 7512
Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply, and Water  0 0  189
Transport  3618 6079 6185
Information and Communications 
688 1681
0 0  136
Wholesale and Retail Trade  37761 29352 44198 138947 139890
Finance and Insurance  2432 709 4263 8339 5462
Real Estate  594 1012 1143 2609 2330
Services  3390 1704 5983 24152  8934
Others  1112 2833 33 1024 --- 
Total of Manufacturing Industries  50616 94222 135804 229958 263601
All Industries  102807 144696 210163 436310 434628
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled 
by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Note: All figures are in millions of yens.   23
 
Table 8     Foreign Affiliates’ Dividend Payout Ratio to Japan by Country 
Country of Incorporation of Affiliate  1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 
All countries  .15   .29   .20   .30   .27  
  United States  .13   .27   .18   .25   .25  
    Canada  .13   .75   .10   .40   .10  
    Mexico  .16   .36   .13   .22   .07  
    Brazil  .09   .27   .22   .28   .16  
    Chile  .13   .17   .06   .48   .04  
    Panama  .31   .72   .93   .44   .93  
  Malaysia  .12   .25   .22   .36   .40  
  Singapore  .16   .41   .29   .83   .53  
  Thailand  .12   .15   .15   .16   .23  
    Indonesia  .19   ---   .18   .27   .17  
    Philippine  .05   .32   .23   .47   .29  
 Hong Kong  .17   .31   .37   .58   .43  
  Taiwan  .21   .18   .31   .26   .31  
  Korea  .12   .17   .25   .26   .21  
 China  .25   .24   .22   .30   .28  
 Saudi Arabia  .16   .32   .18   .10   .27  
  United Kingdom  .21   .23   .20   .36   .46  
    France  .07   .21   .07   .62   .11  
  Germany  .22   .56   .28   .27   .66  
    Belgium  .17   .41   .44   .31   .55  
    Ireland  .04   .36   .27   .56   .06  
  Netherlands  .16   .34   .13   .53   .13  
    Italy  .15   .40   .39   .35   .18  
  Australia  .20   .32   .34   .40   .30  
    Egypt  .11   .13   .06   .38   .36  
    Liberia  .08   .70   .87   .68   .16  
  All others  .14   .19   .10   .13   .17  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled 
by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Note: Dividend payout ratios are calculated by first identifying those affiliates report positive 
net income and then dividing the total dividends paid to Japan by such affiliates in each 
country by their total net income. Dividend payout ratio = (Total dividends paid to Japan by 
foreign affiliates in country X) ÷ (Total affiliate post-tax earnings in country X).   24
 
Table 9     Dividends Paid by Foreign Affiliates to Japan by Country 
Country of Incorporation of Affiliate  1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 
All countries  102807 144696 210163 436310 435220
  United States  20515 28625 49483 165470 142793
    Canada  3242 20898 1721 6032 4925
    Mexico  354 216 1161 2209 1088
    Brazil  3362 1862 5661 5461 7367
    Chile  249 428 3661 4886  683
    Panama  1499 2934 2700 2316 2209
  Malaysia  2625 8995 10546 13601 30311
  Singapore  7313 11184 20006 44158 36704
  Thailand  4254 6178 11569 13789 25813
    Indonesia  2165 ---  8431 6250 6932
    Philippine  422 2549 2145 6426 6570
 Hong Kong  4901 9826 17707 28599 20703
  Taiwan  7745 10421 13627 21174 22095
  Korea  2129 1717 7130 4517  11253
 China  790 1149 4522 19522 38376
 Saudi Arabia  3647 2937 6605 1771 8569
  United Kingdom  6192 3513 7036 15005 17994
    France  334 692 2171 7320 1279
  Germany  5080 5209 6737 9950  14659
    Belgium  2600 3285 2648 5732 2778
    Ireland  367 138 367 2112 1948
  Netherlands  1914 2149 2861 12890  3734
    Italy  415 1707 2905 3771  534
  Australia  9041 8419 10318 16166 13386
    Egypt  86 204 387 3855  325
    Liberia  952 1222 2145 3305  242
  All others  10614 8239 5913 10023 11950
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled 
by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Note: All figures are in millions of yens.   25
 
Table 10     Payments by Foreign Affiliates to Japan 
  1989 1992  1995  1998  2001 
Millions of Japanese Yen   
Dividends  102807 144696 210163 436310 435220
Interest  68147 33932 68250 93459 - 
Royalties  52324 110748 248977 452503 648088
Other Payments  563074 353813 537448 176477 - 
Total Payments  786352 646257 1073732 1171619 1432267
   
Percentage of Total Payments    
  Dividends  13 22  20  37  30 
  Interest    9    5    6    8  - 
  Royalties    7  17  23  39  45 
  Other Payments  72 55  50  15  - 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled 
by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Note: We cannot observe data on interest and other payments for the year 2001.   26
 
Table 11     Distribution Patterns: Foreign Affiliates’ Dividends, Interest, Royalties, and Other Payments Distributed to Japan 
 Dividends Interest Royalties Other  Payments 
Japanese Industry  1989 1995 2001 1989 1995  2001  1989 1995 2001 1989 1995 2001 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  56 264 764 247 947 - 21 35 42 2302 2710 - 
Mining  3828 14392 5387 3906 2963 - 19 184 211 279 3365 - 
Construction  2330 465 1750 63 289 - 52 656 859 1628 3930 - 
Manufacturing    
  Food  1624 9980 7898 328 814 - 226 2371 3802 346 403 - 
  Textile  1969 11246 4500 1899 1825 - 818 1656 2787 197 9894 - 
  Wood, Pulp, and Papers  4274 3234 6216 195 804 - 0 763 1415 4460 329 - 
  Chemicals  10055 23891 31839 543 4670 - 1498 16939 68044 6668 17806 - 
 Petroleum and Coal   44 363 438 0 32 - 3 74 293 0 184 - 
  Ceramics  5059 6888 7410 87 540 - 1873 3587 2772 3146 67645 - 
  Steel  1841 3156 4115 54 867 - 115 337 801 274 7692 - 
 Non-Ferrous Metals  2295 3816 12399 15497 8585 - 706 1676 3742 6233 2335 - 
 Fabricated Metal Products  323 833 1688 593 569 - 127 519 1168 365 8292 - 
  General Machinery  2851 5310 9766 714 321 - 7923 15372 23869 31037 30544 - 
  Electrical Machinery  15264 39852 113197 1750 4080 - 24409 90497 118461 184284 243867 - 
  Transportation Equipment  3450 18027 44158 744 3169 - 8208 93633 384214 98786 49178 - 
  Precision Instruments  393 4885 12465 150 306 - 334 4005 3184 2515 1072 - 
  Miscellaneous Manufacturing  1174 4323 7512 979 643 - 21 6441 5810 19741 9971 - 
Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply, and Water  0 189 0 - 0 0 14584 - 
Transport  3618 6185 12825 - 4 216 9994 - 









Wholesale and Retail Trade  37761 44198 139890 13359 4895 - 3275 4318 16301 190934 42106 - 
Finance and Insurance  2432 4263 5462 6891 4777 - 0 230 0 60 2864 - 
Real Estate  594 1143 2330 4728 3191 - 0 61 416 555 741 - 
Services  3390 5983 8934 6165 11120 - 621 5500 1856 2313 7918 - 
Others  1112 33 0 2762 18 - 54 58 0 2081 8 - 
Total of Manufacturing Industries  50616 135804 263601 23533 27225 - 48282 237870 620362 358052 449212 - 
All Industries  102807 210163 434628 68147 68250 - 52324 248977 647814 563074 537448 - 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Note: All figures are in millions of yens. We cannot observe data on interest and other payments for the year 2001.   27
 
Table 12     The Impact of Corporate Tax on Dividends 
Dependent Variable: Dividends to Japan 









































































Parent Dummies  No No Yes  Yes No No 
Method  OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit  Tobit 
R-Squared  0.6359 0.7915 0.6923 0.8316     
Log-Likelihood       -12991.2  -16086.428 
No. Obs  2848 3632 2848 3632 2848 3632 
Elasticity of Dividends with respect to 
Net Income  0.6403**  0.7480**  0.6444** 0.7530**  0.6572** 0.7586** 
Age 0.5796**  0.2839*  0.7833** 0.2840*  1.6622** 1.2380** 
Ownership 1.0680**  0.8712**  1.2486** 0.7057**  0.5688 -0.3729 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 5% level, **significant at 1% level.   28
 
Table 13     The Impact of Corporate Tax on Dividends by Region or by Industry in 2001 
Dependent Variable: Dividends to Japan 



























































































Method  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLS 
R-Squared  0.2128 0.8961 0.2842 0.2033 0.3907 0.3484  0.9242 
No. Obs  2753 675  669 2189 541 422 873 
Elasticity of Dividends with respect to 
Net  Income 0.5291** 0.7962** 0.9053** 0.5841** 1.1404** 0.6720**  0.7223** 
Age  0.3323**  0.4803 -0.2591 0.1002 -0.0521  -0.1810  0.4951* 
Ownership 0.9675**  0.4296  0.7326  0.9264**  0.7019** -0.0180 0.5494** 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 5% level, **significant at 1% level.   29
 
Table 14     The Impact of Corporate Tax on Dividends with Parent in Loss 
Dependent Variable: Dividends to Japan 

























































Method OLS OLS  Tobit  Tobit 
R-Squared 0.7008 0.8660     
Log-Likelihood    -9558.4353  -12134.436 
No.  Obs 1888 2651 1888 2651 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 5% level, **significant at 1% 
level.   30
Appendix A 
 
Table A1     Comparison of the Two Statistics in 2001  (all industries) 
  Hojin Kigyo Tokei 
[Incorporated Enterprise 
Statistics]        [A] 





B / A 
Subject of 
Investigation 
Finance and Insurance 
excluded 
Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 
excluded 
 
Number of Companies  23887  2093  0.09 
Paid-in Capital  858397  294763  0.34 
Assets 12431100  2909059  0.23 
Sales 13382065  2859273  0.21 
Current Profits  282469  72799  0.26 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Hojin Kigyo Tokei [Incorporated Enterprise 
Statistics] and the Survey of Overseas Business Activities. 
Note: All figures are in 100 millions of yens. 
 
 
Table A2     Comparison of the Two Statistics in 2001 
(paid-in capital ≧ 1 billion yen, without finance, insurance and real estate) 
  Hojin Kigyo Tokei 
[Incorporated Enterprise 
Statistics]        [E] 





F / E 
Paid-in Capital  530677  282984  0.53 
Assets 5598596  2773423  0.50 
Sales 5052610  2711370  0.54 
Current Profits  148871  69408  0.47 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Hojin Kigyo Tokei [Incorporated Enterprise 
Statistics] and the Survey of Overseas Business Activities. 




Distribution of Japanese Multinationals by Industry 
Foreign 
Affiliates (%)  Parents (%)  Industry 
1989 2001 1989 2001 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries   1.2   0.8   1.3   0.6 
Mining   1.5   1.0   1.8   1.0 
Construction   3.0   2.4   4.2   3.8 
Manufacturing  41.6 51.5 62.2 66.0 
  Food   2.3   2.8   3.1   3.7 
  Textiles   2.1   3.0   2.6   5.0 
  Wood, Pulp, and Papers   1.2   0.8   2.6   1.1 
  Chemicals   4.7   7.6   7.3   8.1 
 Petroleum and Coal   0.1   0.3   0.9   0.7 
  Ceramics   1.4   1.3   2.1   2.1 
  Steel   1.6   1.9   1.5   1.7 
 Non-Ferrous Metals   1.6   1.3   1.9   2.0 
 Fabricated Metal Products   1.1   1.4   3.2   2.8 
  General Machinery   4.1   5.2   7.0   8.4 
  Electrical Machinery  10.5  11.7   13.2  12.0 
  Transportation Equipment   5.0   8.4   6.4   8.4 
  Precision Instruments   1.8   1.7   3.8   2.2 
  Miscellaneous Manufacturing   4.0   4.0   6.7   7.8 
Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply, and Water   0.2   0.2 
Transportation   5.3   4.6 





Wholesale and Retail Trade  31.4  25.9 20.3  16.2 
Finance and Insurance   3.1   3.2   0.4   0.6 
Real Estate   3.4   2.0   1.3   0.3 
Services   6.0   6.0   4.3   4.5 
Other   5.0   0.0   1.7   0.0 
      
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled 
by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Notes: The companies belonging to electricity, gas, heat supply, water, transportation, 
information and communications were originally classified into one industry, but 
reclassified and divided into three in 1993.   32
Appendix C 
 
Table C     Descriptive Statistics 
 Year  Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Dividends 2001  4815  90.38  813.64  0  47935 
 1998  4373  99.77  702.58  0  37883 
Tax Rate  2001  13291  32.31  6.47  15  42.1 
 1998  11794  33.86  7.99  15  57 
Openness  2001 13291 99.98 94.60 22.41  375.73 
  1998 11794 95.79 95.27 23.04  354.23 
Net Income  2001  10973  75.65  4277.0  -299480  231355 
 1998  10388  91.52  2501.2  -86695  162535 
Age  2001 13585 12.25  9.50  0.01 121.08 
  1998  12944  10.82 9.24  0.01 97.08 
Ownership  2001 13657 82.92 26.14  0  100 
  1998 13012 82.55 25.77  0.1  100 
Parent in Loss  2001  7491  0.4217  0.4938  0  1 
 1998  7404  0.3487  0.4766  0  1 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Survey of Overseas Business Activities compiled 
by Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
Note: A dummy variable, Parent in Loss, takes the value of 1 when the parent company is in 
loss, and zero otherwise. 